Background
The categorization of verbs shown below can be traced as far back as Aristotle, and has since been examined by Ryle 1949] , Kenny 1963 ], Taylor 1977] and Dowty 1979; , among others.
Statives Activities Accomplishments Achievements know run draw a circle recognize love write build a house reach the top be hungry sleep eat a sandwich wake up Vendler 1967] and Dowty 1979] give a series of tests to determine the category of a speci c verb, including tests for the acceptability of a verb with certain temporal adverbials such as for and in. Dowty's 1986] de nitions of the aspectual classes, originally from Taylor 1977] , are repeated below.
A sentence is stative i it follows from the truth of at an interval I that is true at all subintervals of I. (e.g., if John was asleep from 1:00 until 2:00 PM, then he was asleep at all subintervals of this interval: be asleep is a stative).
A sentence is an activity (or energeia) i it follows from the truth of at an interval I that is true of all subintervals of I down to a certain limit in size (e.g. if John walked from 1:00 until 2:00 PM, then most subintervals of this time are times at which John walked; walk is an activity.)
A sentence is an accomplishment/achievement (or kinesis) i it follows from the truth of at an interval I that is false at all subintervals of I. (e.g. if John built a house in exactly the interval from September 1 until June 1, then it is false that he built a house in any subinterval of this interval: build a house is an accomplishment/achievement.) Treatments of the selectional properties of temporal adverbials often rely on de nitions based on an interval semantics, such as these. I claim that when discussing the interaction of adverbials with aspect it is necessary to refer not only to the interval over which the event occurs, but also to other properties of the event, such as whether it culminates. I'll now construct a description of the aspectual classes which incorporates certain basic properties of events into the Dowty 1986 Irene was happy] this morning. I will say, following Kamp and Rohrer 1990] , that accomplishments and achievements have well-de ned termination points. Conversely, activities and statives have poorly-de ned termination points.
We can test for the presence of a well-de ned termination point by combining a statement which implies that a certain eventuality has terminated with a statement that cancels that implicature. The result is contradictory only when the eventuality has a well-de ned termination point:
(10) Activity: Did Joe jog] this morning? Yes, and he's still jogging.
() poorly-de ned termination) (11) Accomplishment: Did Joe eat his sandwich] this morning? #Yes, and he's still eating his sandwich. () well-de ned termination) I propose that Dowty's framework be complemented by the following:
(12) If a sentence is an activity or a stative then it is true over an interval with a poorly-de ned termination point. If a sentence is an accomplishment/achievement then it is true over an interval (or \preparatory period") with a well-de ned termination point.
For example, if an accomplishment sentence P is true over an interval P t , then P t is an interval with a well-de ned termination point and P is false at all subintervals of P t . . Before discussing in detail the selectional properties of until and its manner of relating intervals, I will introduce the following terminology:
In the DRT treatment of tense, a sentence introduces an event into the discourse (Hinrichs 1981 ], Partee 1984] ). I will say that a sentence (or temporal phrase) A introduces into the discourse an event A e , and that that event is true over the interval A t as per the description of the aspectual classes given in (12). A t corresponds to the notion of event time in Reichenbach's 1947] The ellipsis in the above diagram represents a poorly-de ned endpoint, and the round bracket indicates a well-de ned endpoint. I will use a square bracket to indicate inclusion of an endpoint in an interval and a round bracket to indicate exclusion of that endpoint.
In (40), for example, A e is the state of Joe being homeless, and until indicates that A e occurs in the interval terminating at B tw , the point at which the house is complete. Dowty's de nition of statives tells us that A is true at all subintervals of that interval. (40) Joe was homeless until Irene built him a house. This treatment correctly predicts that Joe is homeless while the house is being built and stops being homeless when the house is nished. This placement of A e implies that A e does not continue past B tw . The implicature can be canceled, however, as in (41): (41) Joe worked until noon. In fact, he worked until 1:00.
Sentences such as (42) appear to falsify the claim that until subcategorizes for an A t with a poorly-de ned endpoint:
(42) Joe drove around the block] for an hour. It has been noted by Moens and Steedman 1988] , however, that a verb may change aspectual class through a process they call coercion. The accomplishment in (42) has been coerced into an activity via iteration of that accomplishment. An activity can also be coerced into an achievement. In (43), for example, he was hungry] conforms to until's requirement that B t contain a well-de ned termination point by taking on an inchoative interpretation.
(43) Joe kept working until he was hungry]. Negation I'll now turn to the shift of focus noted by Karttunen, and show how my treatment of adverbials provides an explanation for this phenomenon.
As stated above, in a positive sentence containing an until adverbial the eventuality described by the matrix sentence, A e , occurs before the time indicated by the until adverbial, but, in the corresponding negative sentence, A e occurs at or after that time. In (44), for example, we are discussing an eventuality (i.e., the holding of the hostages) which occurs before the kidnapper's demands are met, and in (45) we are discussing an eventuality (i.e., the releasing of the hostages) which occurs after the demands are met. These data will support the notion that until aligns the eventuality introduced by the matrix sentence with an interval if we assume that the negation in (47) takes scope over the adverbial phrase (an assumption I'll discuss presently). I have argued that the preposition until combines with a B t to produce an interval in which to place A e . If negation takes scope over the until adverbial, it will a ect the interval produced by that adverbial, thereby a ecting the position in which until places A e .
How does negation a ect this interval? Consider the examples below: (48) Joe realized the answer, but not at noon. (49) Joe was in his o ce, but not during the party. In (48) the realization can occur at any point other than noon. In (49) Joe cannot be in his o ce during the interval over which the party takes place, and the implication is that he was in his o ce for some period before and/or after the party. I'll conclude that the e ect of negation on an interval is to complement that interval, a conclusion consistent with Keenan and Faltz's treatment of negation as a complementation operator Keenan and Faltz, 1985] . The complement of an interval will consist of all the points not included in that interval, schematically:
The interval before 2:00 ) 2:00
The complement of the above interval 2:00 When negation takes scope over until, the interval that until indicates in which to place A e is complemented, and A e is placed in this new interval instead. This analysis correctly predicts that the focus of the sentence will shift to an event occurring on this new interval.
Consider the interpretation of sentence (50) In (50), the phrase until midnight] indicates that the potential placement of A e is the interval terminating at midnight, as shown below. ) midnight When negation takes scope over the until phrase this interval will be complemented, producing an interval whose initial point is at midnight.
Until places A e in this new interval, as below:
Joe sleeps midnight
This placement implies that A e begins at midnight, but context may cancel this implicature, allowing until to place A e later within the interval, as in (52) a. At the earliest he was swimming at noon. b. At the latest he was swimming at noon.
In (53), it is the nal point of A e that is aligned with B tw , giving that point some measure of salience. The phrase at the earliest] selects for an initial point and is therefore infelicitous. In (54), however, A e has been repositioned so that its initial point is aligned with B tw . In this case, at the earliest] is acceptable.
As for the claim that the negation in sentences such as (56) takes scope over the until phrase, sentence (56) cannot be paraphrased in a manner corresponding to the sentential scope of negation, as in (57) 
For
This treatment can be extended to for, avoiding certain problems with existing treatments. Dowty 1979] gives the following truth conditions for for: (58) For (2 P (I V=IV )=(t=i) ) translates into: P t P x P t n^8t t n ! AT(t; Px)]]
If sentence (59) is true, for example, then there is a one hour interval I over which Joe jogs] is true, and at all subintervals of I Joe jogs] is also true.
(59) Joe jogged for an hour.
As Dowty points out, (58) incorrectly predicts that activity sentences such as (59) will be ungrammatical because if an activity sentence is true over an interval I it is not true at all subintervals of I, but only at subintervals down to a certain size. Dowty also notes that habitual and repetitive readings are erroneously ruled out by his analysis; again, (58) requires the A phrase to be true at every subinterval of B t , disallowing gaps between repetitions of A e . Moens and Steedman 1988] alternatively propose that a for adverbial selects for an activity 6 . This analysis incorrectly rules out the acceptability of stative sentences such as (60). (60) Joe was hungry for several hours. In an earlier paper, they suggest that a stative may be coerced into an activity in order to be felicitous with a for adverbial Moens and Steedman, 1986] . However, if, in (60), Joe is hungry for an interval of several hours then
Joe is hungry at all subintervals of that interval, indicating that Joe is hungry] remains a stative sentence by de nition.
An analysis of for along the lines of that proposed for until avoids these problems. This analysis of for requires an A t of the same type as that of until: Eventualities which occur over an interval A t with a poorly-de ned termination point are felicitous with for. Conversely, eventualities which occur over an interval A t with a well-de ned termination point are infelicitous with for: (63) For aligns A e with B t , and A e must occupy the entire B t interval. For example, the operation of for in sentence (68) is to place the eventuality of Joe's sleeping concurrent with the two hour interval, as shown below: (68) Joe slept for two hours. (69) Joe slept for two hours. In fact, he slept for three.
As with until, when negation takes scope over the for phrase, the interval which for indicates in which to place A e is complemented. Consider sentence (70), below: (70) Joe was happy, but not for the two hours his wallet was missing. Complementing the two hour interval shown in (71), we get the interval in which for will place Joe is happy], as shown in (72): (71) ] (72) Joe is happy ) ( Joe is happy A common interpretation of a negated for sentence is that there are not two intervals during which A e occurs, but only the later of the two intervals.
One interpretation of sentence (73) is that I'll be in my o ce two hours from the speech time Reichenbach, 1947] . In (74), I arrive at my o ce two hours after the reference time. Hinrichs 1985] proposes an alternate solution to Dowty's problem. His truth conditions for for are based on a lattice-theoretic approach to events. Using an operator analogous to Carlson's 1977] realization operator, he breaks events into \event stages" and rede nes Dowty's truth conditions for for and in to map these stages onto the interval speci ed by the for phrase.
In this manner he allows gaps, such as those occurring in activities and habituals, in the eventualities selected for by for and in.
In the treatment of prepositions I have proposed, prepositions don't refer to the subintervals of an interval over which a sentence is true. Instead, the eventuality introduced by the sentence is placed in the interval indicated by the adverbial. Whether the sentence is true or false at certain subintervals of that interval depends on Dowty's de nition of the aspectual class of that sentence. In this manner the correct predictions concerning activities are made, and yet the activity retains the properties speci ed by its de nition.
The correct predictions are also made concerning habitual sentences. Using the test given in (12), we nd that habitual sentences introduce eventualities which are true over intervals with poorly-de ned termination points: (75) Irene jogged] for ve years. In fact, she still jogs.
() poorly-de ned termination)
These sentences are correctly predicted to be acceptable with for-phrases. In
In this section, I'll brie y describe how my treatment can be extended to deal with in. In requires A t to be or contain a well-de ned point A tw (the same selectional property that until has for its B t ), and B t to be a time segment (the same as for). In aligns A t with the last point of B t . The initial point of A t is constrained by speech time or by some contextually determined reference time. In (76), for example, there is some ten minute period B t beginning at a contextually determined reference time, and A tw is placed at the end of B t , the point of realization. The complement of this point is shown in (80): (80) )( A tw is placed somewhere in these new intervals. A paraphrase of such a placement is given in (81). (81) Joe didn't build the house in ten months; he built it in nine.
Conclusions
In summary, I have proposed a treatment of the prepositions which head temporal adverbials as binary operators with selectional properties based on an extended version of the Dowty/Taylor de nitions of the aspectual classes and as operators which order their arguments temporally. I have shown that this treatment avoids problems encountered by existing treatments of temporal adverbials, and explains certain facts with respect to the interaction of negation with these adverbials.
One issue raised by this treatment of adverbials is that of compositionality. If until selects for an A t with a poorly-de ned termination point and supplies it with a well-de ned termination point, this new interval should serve as acceptable input to in adverbials, which select for an A t with a well-de ned termination point. Sentences such as (82) are unacceptable, however: (82) #Joe slept until noon in two hours. The di erence between eventualities which culminate and eventualities which don't build to a culmination but simply terminate must be explored. How this di erence can be formalized is a matter for future research.
Another issue is whether achievements should be characterized as having an associated preparatory period. Recall that, when negation takes scope over an until adverbial causing a shift in focus, eventualities of all aspectual classes are acceptable as A e . The initial point of A t is placed concurrently with B tw , causing that initial point to become well-de ned. I have assumed that it is only possible for a poorly-de ned endpoint to become well-de ned, and my treatment depends on this assumption. As a result, I can only explain the acceptability of achievements in these contexts by assuming that achievements have a preparatory period, however negligible that period is. That preparatory period will be an interval whose nal point is the culmination of the achievement and whose initial point is, crucially, poorly-de ned. This is not necessarily a problem, and, in fact, Dowty 1986 ] places achievements in the same class as accomplishments, which do have associated preparatory periods. Karttunen 1974] , Mittwoch 1977 ], Moens and Steedman 1988] , and Vendler 1967] treat achievements as punctual, however, and I thought it worth mentioning that doing so will create complications for my treatment.
